OF THE SOUL IN
Faculties of the soul
The living being differs from the nonliving, and life signifies the following characteristics: intellect, sensation, movement or rest in space. But the movement has a broader meaning -- it also means change, growth and decay. The living organisms have faculty and principle. Life belongs to the living by inheritance of this principle. But what originally constitutes an animal is the ability of sensation, the touch, growth and decay. The soul is the principle of various kinds of life that is defined by various faculties: nutritive and reproductive (threptikon kai gennetikon); appetitive (orektikon): desire, courage, reasoned wish; sensitive (aisthetikon); mobile (in space) (kinetikon kata topon); dianoetic (discursive thinking) (dianoetikon). Plants have only the nutritive faculty; all animals have at least touch for sensitivity; humans and all other who might resemble man have dianoetic faculty and intellect.
Each one of these faculties is a soul or part of the soul and if part, it is not separable logically or in place. The plants once divided continue to live, so the soul is one for each plant in act, but many in possibility. The same applies to the articulate animals -- each part has its own sensitivity, also by necessity the desire, pleasure, pain. Only with respect to the intellectual kind of soul -- Aristotle seems to have some reservation: it is the only kind that could be separated as eternal from the perishable; it is peculiar to the man and perhaps a link with the divine; other parts of the soul are not separable from each other but they are different. It seems that Aristotle has not yet thought completely through the problem or the reported text is not a complete exposé of his thoughts.
Every living thing must possess the nutritive soul and it includes also the ability to reproduce. Plants and embryos at early stages have no more; they absorb nutriment without sensation. Next is sensation, implying the ability to feel pleasure and pain and with it goes the appetency. Some animals possess all sensations, some only certain of them, others only one. And this is what differentiates animals. Among sensations, the primary is touch (afe), (including taste -- chumos) i.e. it can exist without others, but others cannot exist without it. It is necessary for the recognition of food.
The soul as the first principle is responsible for the locomotion and other types of movement: growth, alteration, decay, sensation of space, nutrition which is growth in essence and form. Nutrition is an act of accretion of the contraries that conserves essence which, exists as long as the nutrition does. Three elements are involved in nutrition: the body to be nourished, that with which it is to be nourished and that which nourishes -- the primordial soul. The end of the nourishment is to reproduce a similar being -- thus, this type of soul will be generative soul.
The smallest number of living organisms have reasoning (logismos) and thought (dianoia) -- intelligence, purpose, discursive thinking -- and have all other faculties. Each of these faculties has to be treated differently, but the case of the theoretical intellect or mind is different. We find that for each of these functions we find a more general one.
The special function of the soul is "imagination" fantasía. The imagination is different from the thought and sensation, but it does not exist without sensation. It is a basis for believing, intellectual operations. Imagination is in our power when we want it, it is possible to imagine an object through the eyes of the soul. Aristotle uses the term fantasía for visualization, retention or recovery of the past sensation, something that could be called ideation as the occurrence of perception without the corresponding external stimulation.(22) Fantasía occurs at two levels -- the sensitive and the deliberative or rational, since animals have the power to recall which is a prerequisite to desire without sharing the human faculty of reason.
The scale of life
Nature is organized in a hierarchy of beings starting with the inanimate objects. Aristotle developed a scale of living beings which anticipated the evolutionary scale.
Aristotle's scale of life
Faculties of living beings at various levels
Plants and animalsAnimals
physical desire + courage + rational will
(epithemia thumos boulesis)
But Aristotle never expressed the idea of temporal evolution. His hierarchy was static, inspired by the conviction of permanency of forms and their priority to matter. This concept again fits into the Aristotelian scheme of act and potentiality, form and matter. Aristotle was removed from the idea of evolution -- the cosmic structure, the species and genus were fixed from eternity. Though individuals do not live for ever, they share a collective immortality.
Thus also for beings whose generation is not spontaneous the most natural function is to realize another similar being - e.g. animal for an animal, a plant for a plant -- through this they all participate in the eternal and divine. For a being the end is the eternal, the divine though it is not individually. So the soul as the cause and the principle of the living thing is determined in the three ways: principle of the end (aneka), a cause of an essential form of the body of animals and an actualization of the potentiality. It is a cause and essence. So the cause for being of all things is the essence. The soul for the living beings is their cause and principle, and as actualization is the form of potentiality. Thus the soul is the cause as the end -- the formal cause; the same is with the intellect -- it acts with the end (telos). As to the nature of the living things -- the soul is the end of the animals, natural bodies are the instruments of the soul.
Sensation and its objects
Sensations are a result of the whole living organism -- the soul and the body. They are the results of movement; the passions are as well results of a kind of alteration. But without exterior objects there would be no sensation. What can be sensed? The objects of sense, the sensibles, can be divided into three groups. 1. The sensible things which are proper to every sense. They are essentially perceptible i.e. they are specific or proper to each sense which is especially affected. E.g. color is a special object to the sight, sound to hearing, flavor to taste etc. Such objects cannot be perceived by other senses. Touch is a sense that is sensitive to several qualities. 2. The sensible things which are incidentally perceptible i.e. common to all senses e.g. motion, rest, number, shape, size. These are not proper to any of the specific senses. The sensible here is detected by accident because it is associated with another sensible. E.g. a motion is detected by touch and sight. Aristotle gives, as an example of an incidental sensible, the sight of a white object as "the son of Diares." He is perceived incidentally as an accident of a white patch. Thus there are also objects of which we become aware through the senses -- but themselves they are incidentally objects of sensation as a whole of sensible qualities. In perceiving the special object of a particular sense we cannot be mistaken. But if we use the senses to perceive the phenomena detected by several senses (e.g. motion) or objects that are perceived only incidentally we may make errors.
Common Sensibles and Common Sense
Common sensibles, objects of a "common sense" or a sensation in common (koine aisthesis), affect the faculty of sensation as a whole not differentiated into five senses. Sensation is a unity in the same meaning as a soul -- it is numerically one but divisible in essence or form. The soul as a form or entelechy of the living body manifests itself through different organs so the sensation is manifested through different ways i.e. senses. In the detection of the common sensibles by a common sense there is a union of two things and this is the reason why the common sense may be mistaken. The common sensibles otherwise would not appear and would not be perceived. The common sense allows us clearly to perceive that every thing is another thing, since all things contain also other sensibles.
Is there then a special master organ for the faculty of common sensation? Though in the De anima Aristotle claims that there is no sense-organ for common sensibles, in other works he claims that there is one central faculty for all senses -- faculty of sensation so there is a single master sense organ.(23) It is to the sense as the whole animal body is to the soul. This master organ in the sanguineous animals is the heart, and also the source of animal life. The heart provides the innate natural heat which is necessary to life as a whole. According to ancient physiological concepts the heart was the central organ of digestion where the inner heat was generated, related to the divine element ether, of which the heavenly bodies were made. Aristotle missed the brain as location of the mind. He associated the brain with the quality of "cold" which was contrary to "heat." The brain served, however, the "mind organ" -- the heart, in a way.
How does sensation work?
Using the universal ontological principle, Aristotle developed the theory of sensation. The essence of each sense is determined by relation to the sensible. E.g. what is visible, it is so because of the color which is allowed to pass through the transparent, the diafanes. The color is the actualization of the diafanes, whereas obscurity is the diafanes in potentiality. It is brought into the actualization by fire or something similar. Thus light is an immanence (parousia) of fire or something similar contrary to obscurity. Thus color moves diafanes. At the same time the sense-organ is moved by the air which is used as an intermediary in space to carry color, sound etc. (Democritus said that one could see the vacuum, however, Aristotle denied it). Aristotle asserts a need for an intermediary in space to carry color, the same is true for sound. Air seems to Aristotle to be a universal carrier, though the intermediary for odor is water. Touch according to Aristotle is the only sense that does not require an intermediary -- the body itself is an intermediary and the sense organ is a sort of membrane. Sensation thus is the power to receive sensible forms without matter e.g. color, sound, flavor etc. This power is possessed by the sense-organs:
Thus, what acts here are the bodies, the tangibles, in which the forms reside -- e.g the hot, the cold, the sound, the light, the obscurity, the odor act through the intermediary or directly. We sense fire through an intermediary, simple body, air or water which constitutes the sense-organ. All sense-organs are detected in animals that are not imperfect. As already indicated there is no special one sense-organ for the common sensibles. They are detected by accident. Aristotle, through his ontological concept, abolished earlier explanations of sensations which postulated intervention of material bodies. Empedocles believed e.g. that the sense-organs had pores of the right size to admit actual material particles. In Aristotle's concept, the sense-organs are informed in a material way about the quality they detect that is the physical alteration. But the sensation itself is a purely psychical event. The difference between e.g eye and sight is real, just as between body and soul. Also the plants lack sensation -- they are affected only when matter itself of an external object acts on them just as in the explanation given by Empedocles and the atomists for general sensation.
The Philosophy of Sensation
Sensation is a result of a movement or alteration in a material organ by an exterior objects of sense. But this result is a movement or alteration of the psyche. Its alteration cannot be material, so it means the reception of a form, an immaterial essence. Thus every sense-organ is a receptacle of the sensible without matter. What is detected are images (fantasmata) without the object being present. Thus the act of the sensible and of the sense is the same, but their concept (logos) is not the same. An example of this phenomenon can be given: The sound in actualization or hearing in actualization, what has a potentiality of being heard passes to the actualization. What has potentiality of resounding passes to the actualization -- it resounds. The sound and hearing in actualization resides in the hearing in potentiality. Actualization is the active motor, it is not necessary for the motor to move -- hearing as sound designates one thing. The same is true with other sensations. Thus the action of the affection resides in one who is affected and not in the agent. Thus the actualization of the sensible and of the sensitive resides in the sensitive. The actualization of the sensible and of the sensitive has the specific name e.g. hearing, resonance, audition; the act of seeing opsis is called sight orasis. The actualization of color is not named. The actualization of the sensible and of the sensitive are different concepts. It is necessary that they cease being at the same time. This necessity is not required for sense and the sensible in potentiality. This is why the ancients were not right. The object of the sensation is the sensible, it resides in the sensorium as such, it discerns among the different sensibles which is specific for it. But how do we differentiate the white and the sweet? Both are perceived by the same principle -- it perceives and pronounces the difference; it affirms that the sensibles are different. But this principle is indivisible and it perceives simultaneously different sensibles. And it is impossible for one thing to be contrary movements and to differentiate simultaneously indivisible and inseparable divided logically. Thus, in potentiality what discerns is the same and is indivisibly contraries, but is not logically. Only in the actualization it is divisible thus, it is not possible to be in actualization white and sweet at the same time in the way that it receives the forms of white and of sweet.
Aristotle's use of the ontological doctrine of matter and form to sensation is an advance on the earlier speculations of Greek philosophers. Primarily, it is a criticism of the philosophers who thought they could describe the soul while ignoring the body. For him the potentiality of the sense-organ to receive the form in the act of sensation is the same statement as the potentiality of a seed to grow and become a flowering plant -- both are natural processes. Even today, we cannot say anything more beyond what Aristotle said about the function of the soul. W.A. Sinclair (25) describing the process of vision says that, when light-waves fall on the eye "they cause changes in the retina, and this in turn causes changes in the nerve behind the eye, which in turn causes changes in the brain, after which, in some way we do not understand, we have the experience we call seeing."
The Mind, Reason, Thought or Intellect
The term nous is used loosely meaning an intellectual intuition or all the operations of reason. Aristotles introduces mind in the third book of his treatise as that part of the soul which knows and thinks. He poses a problem from the outset whether intellection (to noein) resembles sensation (to aisthanesthai), that is, whether it is being acted upon by the objects of thought: "The intellect must be therefore impassible but receptive of the form potentially without actually being its object; intellect is to its object, just as sense is to sensation."(26) The notion of being acted upon has two meanings: It may mean the destruction of something by its contraries (as the destruction of the sense-organ by an excessive agent), or its development and progress from potency to act by its agency of the actual. So there is a significant analogy with sensation. Mind is potentially its object and it becomes actually when it thinks, i.e. it receives the intelligible form, the essence. The difference is, however, that the object of thought, the intelligible, is form only, without matter. Consequently this part of the soul which is called intellect is not in any act before it thinks. Therefore it is improbable that it would be mixed with body and that it would have physical qualities or would have a physical organ.(27)
But if mind is a unity and a part of the psyche, and body and soul form a single complex (syntheton), its independence cannot be absolute. Moreover, if it is unmixed in terms of not acting through a bodily organ, it is unaffected by the body's decay and in this sense impassible. Aristotle explains this impassibility by resemblance to the organ e.g. the eye, claiming that in the defective sight it is not the soul that is impaired but the physical agent: "If an old man could get the right sort of eye, he would see like a youth."(28) But Aristotle falls into contradiction saying that if the mind would be destroyed it would be by effects of old age since senility results, not from the affection of the soul, but of the body as it happens in drunkenness and in disease. So how can Aristotle say that drunkenness does not have any effect on the psyche? Instead he says: "Consequently, intellection and contemplation are impaired by loss of some other internal organ, but intellect itself remains impassible... Mind is probably something more divine and impassible."(29)
We learn next that the mind works through an intermediary -- images (fantasmata ): "Intellect is the form of forms (nous eidos eidon), sensation the form of sensibles. Since it seems that nothing exists separately besides perceptible extended bodies, precisely, the intelligible forms exist in the sensible forms; both abstract concepts as well as various states and affections of the perceptible objects. For this reason no one would be able to learn or understand anything without sensation. Thus, also in intellection, one must contemplate with images fantasmata. These resemble the things perceived, but are without matter. "How do the first thoughts differ from images? One has to say that they not only are images but that they cannot occur without them."(30) So Aristotle extends his ontological principle on the sphere of intellection, where immaterial images are the perceptible objects of the intellect. Imagination fantasía extends to reason as deliberative imagination and to sensation as the sensitive imagination. The first one is available only to man. Deliberative kind of imagination is present in animals with reason for they can make decisions between two courses of action -- which is reasoning (logismos). Thus reason can make a unity out of a number of images. Reason is the peculiar faculty of man by which we can perceive universals by the process of generalization from perceived individuals in the act of sensation. Universals reside in the soul itself.
The concept of mind was adopted by Plato and Aristotle from Anaxagoras as the principle responsible for arranging the universe. Aristotle criticized Anaxagoras for not giving the full explanation how mind could work: "Anaxagoras himself says that intellect is impassible and has nothing to do with the rest of things. But being as it is, how and from what cause can it know? This is what Anaxagoras does not say and it is not clear from his declarations."(31) Aristotle's own solution to the problem derives from his doctrine of potentiality and act. Thus he agrees with Anaxagoras that mind is the impassible, unmixed, activity, or originating force to the material which it forms. The "form unmixed" means rather that it is unmixed with its objects, the intelligible forms.(32) Following Plato, he admits that the thinking soul is the place where the forms are and the forms are there potentially, not actually.(33)
But now Aristotle has to discuss the problem whether the mind is a separate entity and whether it could be immortal. In general, the soul cannot exist apart from the body as its actuality. But he previously indicated that there might be something that could exist separately. He indicated already that the nous is probably something more divine and is impassible.(34) Now, following rigorously his ontological principle, Aristotle states that mind must have an active as well as a passive, or an actual and potential component. One of them, the active, has to be separate and independent from the rest of the soul and obviously from the body, whereas the other one, the passive, is not. If so, then Aristotle would contradict himself, claiming previously that the mind was indivisible: mind is the highest faculty of the soul, incorporeal, unmixed with the body, impassible. These qualities suggested some superiority; something like qualities of God. But it has also to be unmixed with other forms in order that it could take all other forms in the process of thinking. Mind, thus like the rest of the soul, is pure potentiality -- "Mind is potentially, in a certain way its objects, but it is nothing actually until it thinks."(35) Human mind cannot think continually, moreover it is as potentiality, pure "matter" in sense of the substratum. It is like a receptacle able to receive the forms, the intelligibles. Again, if so, the mind would be inferior to forms and actuality.
To solve the problem, Aristotle now, proposes to analyze the mind as a whole by comparison with the physical world and without considering its nature: "Since in the whole nature, something is the matter for each class (i.e. what is potentially all those things) and something else which is the efficient cause and an agent, because it makes them all (it is the situation like an art in relation to the material). So that distinction must exist in the soul as well. Therefore, there is one nous (intellect) which becomes all things and the other nous that makes them all. The situation resembles light, since the it, in a sort of way, makes potential colors actual colors."(36)
According to the ontological principle of Aristotle, any change requires a matter with potentiality for change and an external agent to cause the change. This agent must possess in actuality the form which the subject of change will receive: "Everything in potentiality that is affected and undergoes change does so through the agency of an efficient cause already in act."(37) So, this implies that we have in nature a chain of causes until we reach the first cause. So, just as in the physical world (for physical change we have natural becoming through the parent in animals or in plants; in artificial production, the craftsman's design; in sensation, the external agent, so we have in the soul an agent that sets its potentiality in motion. However, difference exists between thought and the physical world: "There is an analogy between the sensation in act and the thought. However, the difference between them is such that the agent which produces the actuality of sensation is external, namely what is seen or what is heard as well as the other sensibles. The reason for this is that the actual sensation is of the individual, whereas the knowledge has for the object the universals, which are in a way contained within the soul itself."(38) In Aristotle's philosophy there must be a progress from potentiality to actuality but, there must be an ultimate as well as an intermediate "telos;" there must be a sequence of causes leading to the First Cause, the Ultimate Being, perfect and supreme. All this derives from his concept of the First Mover, who has to move things and keep them moving. We know today that, even in the physical world, this law of motion is not correct. Nevertheless, following this paradigm, human intellectual activity demands an external and efficient cause. So before the thinking process can take place, a faculty of taking on the intelligibles from an object is needed, the nous, which in the act of thought becomes all things and something, an act or a pure activity which can activate the latent capacity and becomes the form itself. The analogy with light is supposed to approximate this situation though the light itself is a third factor.
Now "This nous is separate, impassible and unmixed being in its essence an activity for what is active is always worth more than what is passive, as principle is superior to matter."(39) So there is nous divided into two parts: a passive nous, which is a "matter" and the second, superior one which is the active nous. The active nous is like principle to the inferior passive nous. Moreover "Knowledge in act is identical with its object. As for the potential knowledge, it is prior in time in the individual, but speaking in absolute terms it is not prior even in time."(40) Aristotle wants to say that as sensation takes on the sensible form of an object (actuality) without its matter, so the object of thought, being an intelligible form without matter, has complete identity with thought. The actual here must precede the potential. This must mean that active reason exists before any human thinking takes place. "It is not true that the intellect in act at one time is thinking and at another is not."(41) It is not possible because its essence is activity, the description fitting the description of Aristotle's god. So this active or creative reason has to be active continually, operating as the motive cause or arche, it necessitates the eternal activity, being a pure actuality: "When separate, it is just what it is and this is only immortal athanaton and eternal aidion. But we do not remember because this is impassible and the passive nous is perishable and without the active (creative) mind, no one (nobody or nothing) thinks."(42) Aristotle suggests here that the part of nous which is pure form, actuality is immortal and eternal and must be impassible in an absolute sense. It does not carry any memory, either from the past or from the present state of existence. If we accept that, this is the part that will survive after death and obviously was before an individual (if it is eternal). The part which carries memory and can receive impressions perishes at death.
From this chapter we can deduce that only the active (or creative) reason, pure essence is immortal, eternal and entirely impassible. It is the motive cause of our ability to reason about the world that is experienced through the unity of our body and soul (psychosomatic unity) which constitutes our nature in this life. It is, however, not affected by any of these impressions and therefore it does not remember (or has any recollection). Therefore, if there is any life after death and is only possible in the form of this active intellect, it is not an individual personality or consciousness.
The remaining question is whether the creative or active reason is an internal part of our human psyche or is it external to it and if so, is it identical with the supreme, self-contemplating Cosmic Nous, the divine First Cause? The line of thinking of Aristotle supports the conclusion that Aristotle had in mind the divine Nous as the creative, active mind:
1. If it is immortal, separable, then it is not easily distinguishable from the First Intellectual Mover and if so, there is no plurality of active intellects in each individual human.
2. Similarly if it is continually active, if it is identical with its objects and if it has temporal priority it has all the qualities of God whose essence is act.
3. The ultimate moving cause in the physical world is the First Mover, though it is not present in physical things. By analogy, the Moving Cause in the soul, activating the thought of man is the ranscendent, Cosmic Nous, active by itself.
Still, mankind occupies a special place in the universe. The term divine "theion" applies to all things in the philosophy of Aristotle, but man is something more divine on account that he possesses reason. He contains more vital heat (not fire), analogous to the elements of the stars ether. "The human race is either the only known kind of animal to partake of the divine, or shares it more fully than any others."(43)
1. The Aristotelian concept of the soul does not correspond to any religious tradition, perhaps with the exception of the Hebrew tradition. The religious concept is fundamentally dualistic, though it may be camouflaged by the assumption of temporary psychosomatic unity with the body in the living organism.
2. Aristotle's concept of the soul fits into his larger onto logical scheme of reality as composed of matter and form, potentiality and actuality.
3. The soul is described as the actuality or form of a living organism (living body) with all its faculties corresponding to the characteristics of life. As there is a gradualness in the degree of complexity of life, so there is a corresponding gradualness in the complexity of the soul. Man is at the top of the scale with the intellectual faculty of syllogism. However, we know today that the difference between the chimpanzee and man is of degree only.
4. The soul, being a form of the living body, perishes with the organism at death.
5. Still, in the Aristotelian ontology, the universe requires the transcendental Primal Mover or the First Cause to keep the universe in motion (changes, transformations - - today we would say continuous evolutionary process) and to maintain it.
6. The human soul is superior to those of plants and ani mals in that, besides all the other psychic faculties, it possesses the faculty (potentiality, dynamis) of thinking, the basis of which is the recognition and manipulation of universals. As the senses are called into activity by the external objects perceived, so similarly the nous of rational living organisms, whose objects are within it, requires a transcendental First Rational Cause, Cosmic Nous, to set in motion the intellectual process.
7. The Aristotelian idea of the First Cause, with all its consequences, is based on the erroneous Law of Motion (corrected by Galileo and Newton) and on the anthropomorphic transposition of the relationship between the cause and effect, "matter" and form (idea), from the sphere of human activity (crafts) to the Universe.
1. Claude Tresmontant Le problème de l'âme. (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1971).
2. Ibidem, pp. 11-14.
3. Ibidem, pp. 14-18.
4. Jonathan Barnes Early Greek Philosophers (Harmonds-worth: Penguin Books, 1987), pp. 81-88.
5. Ibidem, pp. 161-201.
6. Tresmontant, op. cit., pp. 21-28.
7. Mark H. Graeser, John A. Lynn and John W. Schoenheit, Is there Death after Life? Indianapolis, Indiana: Christian Educational Services, Inc., 1993), p. 9.
8. Ibidem, p. 2.
9. E.A. Wallis Budge, The Egyptian Book of the Dead. (The Papyrus of Ani). Egyptian Text, Transliteration and Translation, (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1967, reprint of 1895 edition).
10. Iliad 23.65-67.
11.. Tresmontant, op. cit., pp. 129-133.
12. Michael Servetus, Christianismi restitutio, (Lugduni 1553), pp..168-173.
13. M. Hillar Poland's Contribution to the Reformation: the Polish Brethren and their Ideas on Religious Freedom in The Polish Review, XXXVII, No. 4, 1994, pp. 185-202. M. Hillar From the Polish Socinians to the American Constitution in A Journal from the Radical Reformation. A Testimony to Biblical Unitarianism, Vol. 3, No. 2,1994, pp. 22-57.
14. Quoted by Graeser, Lynn and Schoenheit, op. cit., p. 23.
15. W.K.C. Guthrie A History of Greek Philosophy, Vol. VI Aristotle. An Encounter, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, edition of 1990), pp. 277-279.
16. Guthrie, op. cit., pp. 66-73.
17. Aristotelous Peri Psuches. Traité de l'âme traduit et annoté par G. Rodier, T. I texte et traduction, (Paris: Ernest Leroux, Éditeur, 1900).
18. Ibid. op. cit., B 412 a.
19. Ibid. op. cit., B 412 a.
20. Ibid. op. cit., B 412 b.
21. Ibid. op. cit., B I 412 b.
22. Guthrie, op. cit., p. 287.
23. Ibid. op. cit., p. 296.
24. Aristotle, op. cit., B. 11, 424a,17-b5.
25. In Introduction to Philosophy (1954) quoted by Guthrie, op. cit., p. 308.
26. Aristotle, op. cit., G4, 429a, 15-19.
27. Ibid. G 4, 429a 23-25.
28. Ibid. A 4 408 b 21.
29. Ibid. A 4 408 b 24-29.
30.. Ibid. G 8 432 a 2-14.
31. Ibid. A 2 405b 14-23.
32. Guthrie, op. cit., p. 314.
33. Aristotle, op. cit., G 4 429a 27-29.
34. Ibid. 408 b 29; 413 b 24-27; 403 a 10-11; 408 b 18-19.
35. Ibid. G 4 429 b 30-31.
36. Ibid. G 5 430 a 10 - 17.
37. Ibid. B 5 417 a 17-18.
38. Ibid. B 5 417 b 16-23.
39. Ibid. G 5 430 a 17-19.
40. Ibid. G 5 430 a 19-21.
41. Ibid. G 5 430 a 22
42. Ibid. G 5 430 a 22-25.
43. Aristotle in De partibus animalium quoted in Guthrie, op. cit., p. 326.
Copyright © 2003 Marian Hillar.